3 generalizations seem well established concerning the relationship between subjective religion and ethnic prejudice: (a) On the average churchgoers are more prejudiced than nonchurchgoers; (b) the relationship is curvilinear; (c) people with an extrinsic religious orientation are significantly more prejudiced than people with an intrinsic religious orientation. With the aid of a scale to measure extrinsic and intrinsic orientation this research confirmed previous findings and added a 4th: people who are indiscriminately proreligious are the most prejudiced of all. The interpretations offered are in terms of cognitive style.
Previous psychological and survey research has established three important facts regarding the relationship between prejudiced attitudes and the personal practice of religion.
1. On the average, church attenders are more prejudiced than nonattenders.
2. This overall finding, if taken only by itself, obscures a curvilinear relationship. While it is true that most attenders are more prejudiced than nonattenders, a significant minority of them are less prejudiced.
3. It is the casual, irregular fringe members who are high in prejudice; their religious motivation is of the extrinsic order. It is the constant, devout, internalized members who are low in prejudice; their religious motivation is of the intrinsic order.
The present paper will establish a fourth important finding-although it may properly be regarded as an amplification of the third. The finding is that a certain cognitive style permeates the thinking oj many people in such a way that they are indiscriminately proreligious and, at the same time, highly prejudiced, But first let us make clear the types of evidence upon which the first three propositions are based and examine their theoretical significance.
CHURCHGOERS ARE MORE PREJUDICED
Beginning the long parade of findings demonstrating that churchgoers are more intolerant of ethnic minorities than nonattenders is a study by Allport and Kramer (1946) . These authors discovered that students who claimed no religious affiliation were less likely to be anti-Negro than those who declared themselves to be protestant or Catholic. Furthermore, students reporting a strong religious influence at home were higher in ethnic prejudice than students reporting only slight or no religious influence. Rosenblith (1949) discovered the same trend among students in South Dakota. The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950, p. 212 ) stated that scores on ethnocentricism (as well as on authoritarianism) are significantly higher among church attenders than among nonattenders. Cough's (1951) findings were similar, Kirkpatrick (1949) found religious people in general to be slightly less humanitarian than nonreligious people. For example, they had more punitive attitudes toward criminals, delinquents, prostitutes, homosexuals, and those in need of psychiatric treatment. Working with a student population Rokeach (1960) discovered nonbelievers to be consistently less dogmatic, less authoritarian, and less ethnocentric than believers. Publicopinion polls (as summarized by Stember, 1961) revealed confirmatory evidence across the board.
Going beyond ethnic prejudice, Stouffer (1955) demonstrated that among a representative sample of American church members those who had attended church within the past month were more intolerant of nonconformists (such as socialists, atheists, or communists) than those who had not attended. It seems that on the average religious people show more intolerance in generalnot only toward ethnic but also toward ideological groups.
Is this persistent relationship in any way spurious? Can it be due, for example, to the factor of educational level? Many studies show that people with high education tend to be appreciably less prejudiced than people with low education. Perhaps it is the former group that less often goes to church. The reasoning is false. Sociological evidence has shown conclusively that frequent church attendance is associated with high socioeconomic status and with college education (Demerath, 1965) . Furthermore, Stouffer's study found that the intolerant tendency among churchgoers existed only when educational level was held constant. Struening (1963), using as subjects only faculty members of a large state university (all highly educated), discovered that nonattenders were on the average less prejudiced than attenders. These studies assure us that the association between churchgoing and prejudice is not merely a spurious product of low education. Turning to the theoretical implications of these findings, shall we say that religion in and of itself makes for prejudice and intolerance? There are some arguments in favor of such a conclusion, especially when we recall that certain powerful theological positionsthose emphasizing revelation, election (chosen people), and theocracy (Allport, 1959 (Allport, , 1966 •-have throughout history turned one religion against another. And among sociological factors in religion we find many that make for bigotry. One thinks of the narrow composition of many religious groups in terms of ethnic and class membership, of their pressure toward conformity, and of the competition between them (see Demerath, 1965; Lenski, 1961) . It does seem that religion as such makes for prejudice.
And yet it is here that we encounter the grand paradox. One may not overlook the teachings of equality and brotherhood, of compassion and humanheartedness, that mark all the great world religions. Nor may one overlook the precept and example of great figures whose labors in behalf of tolerance were and are religiously motivated-such as Christ himself, Tertullian, Pope Gelasius I, St. Ambrose, Cardinal Cusa, Sebastian Castellio, Schwenckfeld, Roger Williams, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many others, including the recently martyred clergy in our own South. These lives, along with the work of many religious bodies, councils, and service organizations would seem to indicate that religion as such unmakes prejudice. A paradox indeed.
THE CURVILINEAR RELATIONSHIP
If religion as such made only for prejudice, we would expect that churchgoers who expose themselves most constantly to its influence would, as a result, be more prejudiced than those who seldom attend. Such is not the case.
Many studies show that frequent attenders are less prejudiced than infrequent attenders and often less prejudiced even than nonattenders. Let us cite one illustrative study by Struening (1963) . The curvilinear trend is immediately apparent in Table 1 . In this particular study nonattenders had lower prejudice scores than any group, save only those devotees who managed to attend 11 or more times a month. Without employing such fine time intervals other studies have shown the same curvilinear trend. Thus, in The Authoritarian Personality (p. 212) we learned that in 12 out of 15 groups "regular" attenders (like nonattenders) were less prejudiced than "seldom" or "often" attenders. Employing a 26-item Desegregation Scale in three separate studies, Holtzman (1956) found the same trend as shown in Table 2 . If more evidence for the curvilinear relationship is needed, it will be found in community studies made in New Jersey (Friedrichs, 1959) , North Carolina (Tumin, 1958) , New England (Pettigrew, 1959) , and Ohio Note,-Adapted from Holtzman (1956) , Kelley, Ferson, and Holtzman (1958) , Young, Benson, and Holtzman (1960). and California (Pinkney, 1961) . One could almost say there is a unanimity of findings on this matter. The trend holds regardless of religion, denomination, or target of prejudice (although the case seems less clear for anti-Semitism than for prejudice against other ethnic groups).
What are the theoretical implications? To find that prejudice is related to frequency of church attendance is scarcely explanatory, since it may reflect only formal behavior, not involvement or commitment to religious values. And yet it seems obvious that the regular attenders who go to church once a week or oftener (and several studies indicate that oftener than once a week is especially significant) are people who receive something of special ideological and experiential meaning, Irregular, casual fringe members, on the other hand, regard their religious contacts as less binding, less absorbing, less integral with their personal lives.
At this point, therefore, we must pass from external behavioral evidence into the realm of experience and motivation. Unless we do so we cannot hope to understand the curvilinear relationship that has been so clearly established.
EXTRINSIC VERSUS INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
Perhaps the briefest way to characterize the two poles of subjective religion is to say that the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion. As we shall see later, most people, if they profess religion at all, fall upon a continuum between these two poles. Seldom, if ever, does one encounter a "pure" case. And yet to clarify the dimension it is helpful to characterize it in terms of the two ideal types.
Extrinsic Orientation
Persons with this orientation are disposed to use religion for their own ends. The term is borrowed from axiology, to designate an interest that is held because it serves other, more ultimate interests. Extrinsic values are always instrumental and utilitarian. Persons with this orientation may find religion useful in a variety of ways--to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. The embraced creed is lightly held or else selectively shaped to fit more primary needs. In theological terms the extrinsic type turns to God, but without turning away from self.
Intrinsic Orientation
Persons with this orientation find their master motive in religion. Other needs, strong as they may be, are regarded as of less ultimate significance, and they are, so far as possible, brought into harmony with the religious beliefs and prescriptions. Having embraced a creed the individual endeavors to internalize it and follow it fully. It is in this sense that he lives his religion, A clergyman was making the same distinction when he said, Some people come to church to thank God, to acknowledge His gloty, and to ask His guidance. . . . Others come for what they can get. Their interest in the church is to run it or exploit it rather than to serve it.
Approximate parallels to these psychological types have been proposed by the sociologists Fichter (19S4) and Lenski (1961) . The former, in studying Catholic parishioners, classified them into four groups: the dormant, the marginal, the modal, and the nuclear. Omitting the dormant, Fichter estimated in terms of numbers that 20% are marginal, 70% modal, and less than 10% nuclear. It is, of course, the latter group that would most closely correspond to our conception of the "intrinsic." Lenski distinguished between church members whose involvement is "communal" (for the purpose of sociability and status) and those who are "associational" (seeking the deeper values of their faith).
These authors see the significance of their classifications for the study of prejudice, Fichter has found less prejudice among devout (nuclear) Catholics than among others (see Allport, 1954, p. 421) , Lenski (1961, p. 173) reported that among Detroit Catholics 59% of those with a predominantly "communal" involvement favored segregated schools, whereas among those with predominantly an "associational" involvement only 27% favored segregation. The same trend held for Detroit Protestants.
The first published study relating the extrinsic-intrinsic dimension directly to ethnic prejudice was that of Wilson (1960) . Limiting himself to a IS-item scale measuring an extrinsic (utilitarian-institutional) orientation, Wilson found in 10 religious groups a median correlation of .65 between his scale and anti-Semitism, In general these correlations were higher than he obtained between anti-Semitism and the Religious-Conventionalism Scale (Levinson, 19S4) . From this finding Wilson concluded that orthodoxy or fundamentalism is a less important factor than extrinsicness of orientation.
Certain weaknesses may be pointed out in this pioneer study. Wilson did not attempt to measure intrinsicness of orientation, but assumed without warrant that it was equivalent to a low score on the extrinsic measures. Further, since the items were worded in a unidirectional way there may be an error of response set. Again, Wilson dealt only with Jews as a target of prejudice, and so the generality of his finding is not known.
Finally, the factor of educational level plays a part. Wilson used the California Anti-Semitism scale, and we know that high scores on this scale go with low education (Christie, 1954; Pettigrew, 1959; Titus & Hollander, 1957; Williams, 1964) . Further, in our own study the extrinsic subscale is negatively correlated with degree of education (r = -.32). To an appreciable extent, therefore, Wilson's high correlations may be "ascribed" to educational level.
At this point, however, an important theoretical observation must be made. Low education may indeed predispose a person toward an exclusionist, self-centered, extrinsic, religious orientation and may dispose him to a stereotyped, fearful image of Jews. This fact does not in the least affect the functional relationship between the religious and the prejudiced outlooks. It is a common error for investigators to "control for" demographic factors without considering the danger involved in doing so. In so doing they are often obscuring and not illuminating the functional (i.e., psychological) relationships that obtain (see Allport, 1950) .
Following Wilson the task of direct measurement was taken up by Feagin (1964) who used a more developed scale-one designed to measure not only extrinsic orientation but also the intrinsic, His scales are essentially the same as those discussed in a later section of this paper. In his study of Southern Baptists Feagin reached four conclusions: (a) Contrary to expectation, extrinsic and intrinsic items did not fall on a unidimensional scale but represented two independent dimensions; (b] only the extrinsic orientation was related to intolerance toward Negroes; (c) orthodoxy as such was not related to the extrinsic or intrinsic orientation; (d) greater orthodoxy (fundamentalism of belief) did, however, relate positively to prejudice.
Taking all these studies together we are justified in assuming that the inner experience of religion (what it means to the individual) is an important causal factor in developing a tolerant or a prejudiced outlook on life.
Yet, additional evidence is always in place, and new insights can be gained by a closer inspection of the rather coarse relationships that have been established up to now. THE PKESENT STUDY We wished to employ an improved and broader measure of prejudice than had previously been used. And since direct measures of prejudice (naming the target groups) have become too sensitive for wide use, we wished to try some abbreviated indirect measures. Further, we wished to make use of an improved Extrinsic-Intrinsic scale, one that would give reliable measures of both extrinsic and intrinsic tendencies in a person's reli-gious life. For these reasons the following instruments were adopted.
Social Problems Questionnaire
This scale, devised by Harding and Schuman (unpublished 1 ; see also Schuman & Harding, 1963 , 1964 , is a subtly worded instrument containing 12 anti-Negro, 11 antiJewish, and 10 anti-other items (pertaining to Orientals, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans). The wording is varied so as to avoid an agreement response set.
Indirect Prejudice Measures
Six items were taken from Gilbert and Levmson's (19S6) Custodial Mental Illness Ideology Scale (CMI). Example: "We should be sympathetic with mental patients, but we cannot expect to understand their odd behavior, a) I definitely disagree, b) I tend to disagree, c) I tend to agree, d) I definitely agree."
Four items are related to a "jungle" philosophy of life, suggesting a generalized suspiciousness and distrust. Example: "The world is a hazardous place in which men are basically evil and dangerous, a) I definitely disagree, b) I tend to disagree, c) I tend to agree, d) I definitely agree."
In all cases the most prejudiced response receives a score of 5 and the least prejudiced response, 1. No response was scored 3.
From Table 3 we see that while the indirect measures have a positive correlation with each other and with direct measures the relationship is scarcely high enough to warrant the substitution of the indirect for the direct. The high correlations between prejudice for the three ethnic target groups once again illustrate the well-established fact that ethnic prejudice tends to be a broadly generalized disposition in personality.
Religious Orientation Measure
The full scale, entitled "Religious Orientation," is available from ADI.
2 It separates the intrinsically worded items from the extrinsic, gives score values for each item, and reports on item reliabilities. In all cases a score of 1 indicates the most intrinsic response, a score of 5, the most extrinsic. While it is possible to use all 20 items as one continuous scale, it will soon become apparent that it is often wise to treat the two subscales separately. A sample item from the extrinsic subscale follows: "What religion offers me most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike, a) I definitely disagree, 1. b) I tend to disagree, 2. c) I tend to agree, 4. d) I definitely agree, 5." A sample item from the intrinsic subscale: "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life, a) this is definitely not so, 5. b) probably not so, 4. c) probably so, 2. d) definitely so, 1.
SAMPLE
While our sample of six groups of churchgoers shows some diversity of denomination and region, it is in no sense representative. Graduate-student members of a seminar collected the 309 cases from the following church groups: Group A, 94 Roman Catholic (Massachusetts); Group B, SS Lutheran (New York State) ; Group C, 44 Nazarene (South Carolina); Group D, 53 Presbyterian (Pennsylvania) ; Group E, 3S Methodist (Tennessee); Group F, 28 Baptist (Massachusetts).
We labeled the groups alphabetically since such small subsamples could not possibly lead to valid generalizations concerning denominations as a whole. All subjects knew that they were invited to participate as members of a religious group, and this fact may well have introduced a "proreligious" bias.
GROSS RESULTS
If we pool all our cases for the purpose of correlating religious orientation with preju- dice, we discover that while the findings are in the expected direction they are much less impressive than those of previous studies, especially Wilson's.
Correlations with Extrinsic Subscale
Since Wilson employed an extrinsic scale similar to ours, we first present in Table 4 our findings using this subscale and the various measures of prejudice. Whereas Wilson found a correlation of .65 between his extrinsic and anti-Semitic measures, our correlation falls to .21. In part the reason no doubt lies in certain features of Wilson's method which we have criticized.
Correlations with Combined ExtrinsicIntrinsic Scale
From the outset it was our intention to broaden Wilson's unidirectional (extrinsic) measure to see whether our hypothesis might hold for the total scale (combined scores for the 11 extrinsic and 9 intrinsic items). As Table S shows, matters do not improve but seem to worsen. The logic of combining the two subscales is of course to augment the continuum in length and presumably enhance the reliability of the total measure. It soon became apparent, however, that subjects who endorse extrinsically worded items do not necessarily reject those worded intrinsically, or vice versa. It turns out that there is only REFORMULATION OF THE APPROACH Examination of the data reveals that some subjects are indeed "consistently intrinsic," having a strong tendency to endorse intrinsically worded items and to reject the extrinsically worded. Correspondingly others are "consistently extrinsic." Yet, unfortunately for our neat typology, many subjects are provokingly inconsistent. They persist in endorsing any or all items that to them seem favorable to religion in any sense. Their responses, therefore, are "indiscriminately proreligious."
The problem is essentially the same as that encountered by the many investigators who have attempted to reverse the wording of items comprising the F scale, in order to escape an unwanted response-set bias. Uniformly the effort has proved to be frustrating, since so many subjects subscribe to both the positive and negative wording of the same question (see Bass, 1955; Chapman & Bock, 1958; Chapman & Campbell, 1959; Christie, 1954; Jackson & Messick, 1957 ).
An example from our own subscales would be: "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life" (intrinsic). "Though I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life" (extrinsic).
The approach used by Peabody (1961) offers us a model for analyzing our data in a meaningful way. Peabody administered both positive and negative F-scale items to subjects at two different testing sessions. By comparing each individual's responses to the same question stated positively at one time and in reverse at another he was able to separate out those who were consistently pro or anti toward the content of authoritarian items. But he found many who expressed double agreement (or disagreement) with both versions of the same question. Table 6 applies Peabody's paradigm to our data.
In assigning our 309 cases to these categories we employed the following criteria.
Intrinsic type includes individuals who agree with intrinsically worded items on the intrinsic subscale, and who disagree with extrinsically stated items on the extrinsic subscale. By the scoring method employed these individuals fall below the median scores on both subscales. Extrinsic type includes individuals who agree with extrinsically stated items on the extrinsic subscale, and who disagree with items on the intrinsic subscale. By our scoring method these individuals all fall above the median scores on both subscales.
Indiscriminately proreligious includes those who on the intrinsic subscale score at least 12 points less than on the extrinsic subscale. (This figure reflects the fact that a subject gives approximately 50% more intrinsic responses on the intrinsic subscale than we should expect from his extrinsic responses to the extrinsic subscale.)
Indiscriminately antireligious or nonreligious includes those who would show a strong tendency to disagree with items on both subscales. Since nonchurchgoers are excluded from our samples, such cases are not found. (Some pilot work with markedly liberal groups indicates that this type does exist, however, even among members of "religious" organizations.) Table 7 gives the percentage of the three types.
RESULTS OF THE REFORMULATION
The five measures of prejudice were analyzed by a 6 (Groups) X 3 (Religious Types) analysis of variance. that there is both a significant difference between the three types of religious orientation and between the six subsamples in the level of prejudice.
3 Examination of the means shows two trends: (a) The extrinsic type is more prejudiced than the intrinsic type for both direct and indirect measures; (b) the indiscriminate type of religious orientation is more prejudiced than either of the two consistent types. Statistically all these trends are highly significant. We note especially that the scores of the indiscriminate type are markedly higher on all measures than the scores of the intrinsic type. Corresponding F ratios for paired comparisons range from 8.4 for the jungle scale to 20.4 for the CMI scale. The differences between the indiscriminate and extrinsic types are smaller. For the anti-Jewish and CMI scales these differences are, however, beyond the .005 level; for the anti-other and jungle scales, at the .OS level. For the anti-Negro the difference falls below significance,
The relationship between the indiscriminately proreligious orientation and prejudice receives support (see Table 9 ) when we compare subjects who are moderately indiscriminate with those who are extremely indiscriminate. (In the first group the scores on the intrinsic subscale average 16 points lower than on the extrinsic subscale, whereas the extreme cases average 23 points less on the intrinsic than on the extrinsic subscale.)
The discovery that the degree of indiscriminateness tends to relate directly to the degree of prejudice is an important finding. It can only mean that some functional relationship obtains between religious muddleheadedness (for that is what indiscriminate scores imply) and antagonism toward ethnic groups. We shall return to this interpretation in the concluding section of this paper.
RESULTS FOR SUBSAMPLES
It would not be correct to assume that the variance is distributed equally over all the subsamples, for it turns out that the denominational groups differ appreciably in prejudice scores and in religious type, as Tables 10 and 11 indicate. It is true that when we combine subsamples all the trends are in the expected direction, but troublesome exceptions occur for single groups as indicated by the nearly significant interaction effects. The most troublesome contradictions appear in relation to the anti-Negro measures based on the Harding-Sclniman scale. Table 10 discloses certain sore points, even though the average trend over all the subsamples is in the predicted direction.
For Groups A, B, and C we note that the indiscriminate type is slightly less prejudiced than the extrinsic type, and for Groups D and E the extrinsic type seems actually less prejudiced than the intrinsic. (Groups I) and E are consistently more troublesome than other subsamples, perhaps because of some salient racial issue in the local community. It will be noted that both these groups are considerably more anti-Negro than the other subsamples.)
By way of contrast we present in Table 11 the results for the short (five-item) CMI scale. With the exception of the indiscriminate type in Group F, the progression of scores is precisely as expected. Each subsample shows that the intrinsic type is less prejudiced toward the mentally ill than the extrinsic type, and the extrinsic type is less prejudiced than the indiscriminately proreligious. 4 Returning in a different way to the original question of whether consistent extrinsic and intrinsic orientations make for prejudice and for tolerance, respectively, we shall now examine this matter in each subsample separately. Inspection of the mean scores and 4 If we apply a more severe test, asking whether all differences between groups are significant, we find the following results. In four of the six groups (in both Tables 10 and 11 ) the extrinsic type is significantly more prejudiced than the intrinsic. Likewise in four out of six groups (Table 10 ) and five out of six (Table 11) , the indiscriminate type is significantly more prejudiced than the intrinsic. However, in only two of the six groups (in both  Tables 10 and 11 ) is the indiscriminate type significantly more prejudiced than the extrinsic.
variance for the total scale indicates that we are dealing with a relatively narrow range of variation. To minimize the effect of a narrow range of scores and skewed distributions, we used Kendal's (19SS) tan as a measure of degree of relationship between prejudice and consistent religious orientation. The results are given in Table 12 . While the correlations are not high (14 are significant in the expected direction), only one (in the troublesome Group E) is significant in the reverse direction.
EDUCATIONAL DIFFERENCES
Computing the actual years of schooling for all groups we find that the indiscriminate type has significantly less formal education than the intrinsic cases (p > .005, F = 18.29), and somewhat less than the extrinsic type (p>.10, F = 2.89). Comparing extrinsic with intrinsic types we find that the former has finished fewer years of schooling (p > .10, F-3A5). (Oddly enough the groups with highest average education are D and E, which also displayed the highest anti-Negro and anti-Semitic prejudice-perhaps because of particular local conditions.)
In our survey of earlier studies we saw that educational level is often a factor in the various relationships discovered between religion and prejudice. We have also argued that demographic factors of this sort should not be allowed to obscure the functional (psychological) analysis that the data call for. Granted that low education makes for indiscriminate thinking, the mental confusion that results from low education may have its own peculiar effects on religious and ethnic attitudes. 
SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATIONS
At the outset we stated three propositions that seem to be firmly established: (a) Churchgoers on the broad average harbor more ethnic prejudice than nonchurchgoers; (b) in spite of this broad tendency a curvilinear relationship in fact exists; (c) the intrinsically motivated churchgoers are significantly less prejudiced than the extrinsically motivated. Our present research supplies additional strong support for the second and third of these propositions.
To these propositions we add a fourth: churchgoers who are indiscriminately proreligious are more prejudiced than the consistently extrinsic, and very much more prejudiced than the consistently intrinsic types.
The psychological tie between the intrinsic orientation and tolerance, and between the extrinsic orientation and prejudice, has been discussed in a series of papers by Allport (19S9, 1963 Allport (19S9, , 1966 . In brief the argument holds that a person with an extrinsic religious orientation is using his religious views to provide security, comfort, status, or social support for himself-religion is not a value in its own right, it serves other needs, and it is a purely utilitarian formation. Now prejudice too is a "useful" formation: it too provides security, comfort, status, and social support. A life that is dependent on the supports of extrinsic religion is likely to be dependent on the supports of prejudice, hence our positive correlations between the extrinsic orientation and intolerance. Contrariwise, the intrinsic religious orientation is not an instrumental device. It is not a mere mode of conformity, nor a crutch, nor a tranquilizer, nor a bid for status. All needs are subordinated to an overarching religious commitment. In internalizing the total creed of his religion the individual necessarily internalizes its values of humility, compassion, and love of neighbor. In such a life (where religion is an intrinsic and dominant value) there is no place for rejection, contempt, or condescension toward one's fellow man. Such is our explanation for the relationship between extrinsic religion and prejudice, and between intrinsic religion and tolerance.
Our present task is to discover, if we can, some similar functional tie between prejudice (as measured both directly and indirectly) and the indiscriminately proreligious orientation. The common factor seems to be a certain cognitive style. Technically it might be called "undifferentiated thinking," or excessive "category width," as defined by Pettigrew (1958) . Rokeach (1960) notes the inability of the "dogmatic" mind to perceive differences; thus, whereas some people distinguish in their thinking and feeling between Communists and Nazis, the undifferentiated dogmatist has a global reaction (cognitive and emotional) toward "Communazis."
We have no right, of course, to expect all our subjects to make discriminations exactly corresponding to our own logic. Nor should we expect them to read and respond to every item on the Extrinsic-Intrinsic scale according to its full meaning as intended by the investigators. Perhaps we should be gratified that two-thirds of our cases can be safely classified as "consistent" (i.e., having about the same strength of disposition toward an extrinsic or intrinsic orientation across most of the items). These consistent cases, as we have seen, support the hypothesis with which we started. It is the remaining (indiscriminate) one-third of the cases which obscure the trend (or diminish its statistical significance).
In responding to the religious items these individuals seeni to take a superficial or "hit and run" approach. Their mental set seems to be "all religion is good." "My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole life"-Yes! "Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life"-Yes! "Religion is especially important to me because it answers many questions about the meaning of life"-Yes! "The church is most important as a place to formulate good social relationships"-Yes! There seems to be one wide category-• "religion is OK." From the way in which the scale is constructed this undifferentiated endorsement can be the product of an agreement response set. Our inconsistently proreligious may be "3'easayers" (Couch & Keniston, 1960) . But if so, we are still dealing with an undifferentiated cognitive disposition. We recall likewise that the inconsistent cases have a lower level of formal education than the consistent cases. This factor also is relevant to the formation and holding of overwide categories.
But why should such a disposition, whatever its source, be so strongly related to prejudice, in such a way that the more undifferentiated, the more prejudiced-as Table 9 shows?
The answer is that prejudice itself is a matter of stereotyped overgeneralization, a failure to distinguish members of a minority group as individuals (Allport, 19S4, Chaps. 2, 10) . It goes without saying that if categories are overwide the accompanying feeling tone will be undifferentiated. Thus, religion as a whole is good; a minority group as a whole is bad.
It seems probable that people with undifferentiated styles of thinking (and feeling) are not entirely secure in a world that for the most part demands fine and accurate distinctions. The resulting diffuse anxiety may well dispose them to grapple onto religion and to distrust strange ethnic groups. The positive correlation between the jungle items and other prejudice scales (Table 3) is evidence for this interpretation.
Our line of reasoning, readers will recognize, is compatible with various previous contributions to the theory of prejudice. One thinks here of Rokeach's concept of dogmatism; of Schuman and Harding's (1964) discovery of a "confused" type in their study of the relation between rational consistency and prejudice; of the same authors' work on sympathetic identification (1963); of studies on the dynamics of scapcgoating, the role in insecurity, of authoritarian submission, of intolerance for ambiguity, and of related concepts.
All in all we conclude that prejudice, like tolerance, is often embedded deeply in personality structure and is reflected in a consistent cognitive style. Both states of mind are emeshed with the individual's religious orientation. One definable style marks the individual who is bigoted in ethnic matters and extrinsic in his religious orientation. Equally apparent is the style of those who are bigoted and at the same time indiscriminately proreligious. A relatively small number of people show an equally consistent cognitive style in their simultaneous commitment to religion as a dominant, intrinsic value and to ethnic tolerance.
One final word: our research argues strongly that social scientists who employ the variable "religion" or "religiosity" in the future will do well to keep in mind the crucial distinction between religious attitudes that are intrinsic, extrinsic, and indiscriminately pro. To know that a person is in some sense "religious" is not as important as to know the role religion plays in the economy of his life. (The categories of nonreligious and indiscriminately antireliglous will also for some purposes be of central significance, although the present research, confined as it is to churchgoers, does not employ them.)
